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By STANLEY A. KAPLAN

This presentation by Stanley A. Kaplan, Professor
of Law at the University of Chicago, was delivered
at the Third Annual Securities Law Institute of the
Practicing Law Institute held on November 5, 1971
in New York City and is reprinted with permission.
It should be noted that this was prior to the filing of
the widely-known complaint in SEC v. The National
Student Marketing Corp., Civil No. 225-72 (B.D.C.
filed February 3, 1972). The text of the complaint is
set forth in BNA Securities Regulation &Law Report
No. 138, page D-1 (February 9, 1972) and in CCH
Federal Securities Law Reporter (current) 1 93,316
(1972). It should also be noted that the case of Kohn
v. American Metal Climax, Inc., discussed herein,
has subsequently been affirmed and modified on
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
458 F.2d 255 (1972). The Court of Appeals found that
the law firm which had been charged with representing both parent and subsidiary in merger negotiations between them had in fact ceased to have
such a dual representation before the negotiations
reached a significant point; the Court of Appeals did
not say anything further concerning the remarks of
the District Judge on this point, which are quoted
and discussed herein. Other participants in the discussionareRobertH. Mundheim, ArthurFleisher, Jr.,
and Philip A.Loomis. Jr.

Conflicts of Interest
in Corporate Law Practice
By Stanley A. Kaplan

I. THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

I think our starting point has to be the Code of
Professional Responsibility which the American Bar
Association adopted in 19691 and which has been
adopted in practically all states since then.
In addition to that, I think we have to take note of
the fact that most of the recent lay publications with
respect to lawyers that I have read in the last couple
of years have been tinged with increasing abrasiveness and have been damning with ever fainter praise
the position of the legal community in our society.
The recent Fortune articles,2 some of the comments of our more prominent judges, and recent
publications that I have seen from some state bar
associations indicate that we may be in for a needed
self-examination and a much greater self-policing
operation than we have had in the practice of law
before. Some of it may be less than palatable to a
great many of us.
A. Canon 5
You all have available the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Canon 5.3 And I commend to you that
you read with some fascination Ethical Considerations 14 through 18 at your leisure.4 I think you will
find, if you have not read them, as I confess I had
1. The Code of Professional Responsibility was adopted by the
House of Delegates of the ABA on August 12, 1969. to become effective for ABA members on January 1, 1970. It was amended by
the House of Delegates on February 24, 1070.
2. E.g.. Burk, We Suddenly Feel That Low Is Vulnerable. FOR.
TUNE (Dec. 1971).
3. "The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms.. [which]
embody the general concepts from which the Ethical Considera.
tionis] and the Disciplinary Rules are derived." Preliminary State.
ment to the Code of Professional Responsibility. The current Code
is set out in MARTINDALE-HUBBELL Vol. 5 (1972)
4. "The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character
and represent the objective toward which every member of the
profession should strive." Id.
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not until a short time ago, that they lay down some
rather serious problems for the lawyer in ordinary
corporate practice.
The general position of the Code is that the lawyer
is prevented or is prohibited from representing differing interests. The prior Canons of Ethics spoke of
not representing conflicting interests.5 Differing
interests, as I read it, is a broader term and, as it is
defined in the Code, it includes conflicting interests
as well as several other types of potential differences.
In this area of the lawyer's responsibility in corporate practice, there has been very little literature,
very few judicial opinions and very few interpretations by the Ethics Committee of the American Bar
Association or of the more prominent bar associations in our larger cities. I am not sure whether that
fact is attributable to a pristine state of purity or
just a failure really to look at the complexities of the
situations that the larger corporate practice involves. I rather hope it's the former.
The initial prohibition in the Code against representing differing interests is then somewhat relaxed
by saying that the lawyer may not represent conflicting interests if his judgment may be impaired
thereby or his loyalty divided. If he decides that this
impairment of judgment or division of loyalty will
not occur. then he must. before h. undertakes dual
representation, make full disclosure to all of his
clients and obtain their consent. Full disclosure
means evaluation of the various kinds of ramifying
difficulties that the client may face and the problems
that the client ought to consider before permitting
duality of representation. The burden is on the lawyer to make the decisions as to whether there are
differing interests or whether there is a situation in
which his loyalty will be impaired or his judgment
affected.

5. See ABA Canon 6, "Within the meaning of the canons, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client,
it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose."
6. EC 5-14 speaks of interests which may be "conflicting, inconsistent, diverse. or otherwise discordant."
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B. The Prior Canons of Ethics
One of the comments on the prior Canons of Ethics,
which I find of interest, is that of Carl McGowan,
now a judge of the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia, in a conference on this general subject at
the University of Chicago Law School held in 1961.
He was speaking of the earlier Canons of Ethics and
he said:
"There are some things of interest to note about
these paragraphs. The first imposes a duty of full
disclosure to prospective clients of any interest in
the controversy or the parties thereto. This seems
to throw the burden of avoiding the conflict, or at
least of approving it, upon the client or prospective client who is fully informed. I would suggest
that this is unrealistic. I do not myself believe that
it is the client who can best make the decision as
to whether it is a harmful conflict, even though he
knows all the facts. In most cases the client is going to act upon the basis of his lawyer's opinion
on this, as on all other aspects of the legal problem
at hand. It is the lawyer's job to see to it that he
acts rightly."
7
In the recent case of E. F. Hutton & Co. v Brown,
the court similarly said: "The obligation to search
out and to disclose potential conflicts is placed on
the attorney, in order to put the client in a position
to protect himself in obtaining substitute counsel if
he so desires." 8

U. IDENTIFYING THE CLIENT
Judge McGowan was speaking of house counsel
because he was then general counsel of the Northwestern Railroad. I think his comments apply equally
to outside independent counsel for a corporation.
He continued his remarks as follows:
"However, sometimes it may well be asked in
the case of house counsel: Who is the client? Is it
the management? Or is it the whole body of stock7. 305 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
8. Id. at 398.

5

holders, including any particular group who may
not be completely happy at that time with the
management? What are the obligations of house
counsel with respect to disclosure of information
to dissident stockholders, for example? Does he
have some obligation in that regard? Or is he to
owe a full and undivided loyalty to the people who
hired him-existing management, a part of which
he is? This problem, you see, can come up in proxy
fights, it can come up in stockholders' suits, and I
have no solutions to suggest, except to say that I
think we may anticipate that there will be a developing body of principles and rules with respect
to these situations as their increasing incidence
creates a demand for guidance."
The problem of identifying one's actual client is
faced by all lawyers in a multitude of corporate
situations beginning with the simplest and most
basic relationship, e.g., when two brothers come in
and ask you to set up a corporation for them. It multiplies and ramifies and becomes more complex as
the relationship between counsel and the real
parties in interest becomes multiplied, more distant,
and more complex.
In the background of this problem of representation of conflicting interests, one significant event
which sheds some light was the inquiry into the
ethics of Louis Brandeis when he was considered
for appointment to the Supreme Court of the United
States. In a very interesting discussion of this situation, John Franks discussed the fact that Brandeis
had counseled the making of an assignment for the
benefit of creditors and then had later moved vigorously to force the assignee to comply with the
assignee's obligations under the assignment. This
was asserted to be a basis for disqualifying him
from appointment for unethical conduct. Frank
states as follows:
"Agood share of any embarrassment Brandeis
suffered over the Lennox case10 is due to his own
use of what must have been one of the most unfortunate phrases he ever casually uttered....
9. Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis. 17 Stan. L. Rev.

683 (1964).
10. Id. at 698.703.
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Whipple reported that when he asked Brandeis
for whom the latter was counsel when he advised
the assignment, Brandeis replies, 'I should say
that I was counsel for the situation.'
"This is a misty phrase which could have meant
one thing to Brandeis, another to Whipple, and
might mean something else again to today's
lawyer. Lawyers are not retained by situations,
and the adversary system assumes that they faithfully represent one interest at a time.""
In the simple, close corporation context, considerations of expense, expeditious handling, and the
dubious belief that a lawyer can fairly represent
both sides of the transaction, often lead the lawyer
for the corporation to represent both the corporation
on one side and a major shareholder or a significant
management figure on the other. In that kind of
situation. at least the lawyer can get all the concerned people in one room and explain the difficulties to them fully. Even if the lawyer does that, it
should be noted that he does not act in the lawyer's
usual role. He is not acting as an advocate for one
person or as counsel to one person. He is acting as a
neutral resource person; his role as counsel is one
in which he is emasculated unless. of course, he
represents one person rather than the others, in
which case he must disclose that and should tell the
other persons present that he is not acting for them
and that they had better get independent counsel.
Though this is often done, I suspect that all of us
who have undertaken this kind of representation
have probably come to regret it.
In a situation which involves a publicly held corporation, complex transactions, and a large number
of stockholders, then, counsel who acts as "attorney
for the situation" really faces complicated problems.
I think there are a great number of possibilities of
injustice to clients and a great number of even more
significant problems of embarrassment and difficulty for counsel. Fortunately, we have some comments by a court on this general subject in the Amax
case,' 2 involving a merger between a parent and
partially owned subsidiary.
11. Id. at 702.
12. Kohn v. American Metal Climax. Inc., 322 F. Supp. 1331
(E.D. Pa. 1970).
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M. DERIVATIVE SUITS
Before considering the facts in that case, I would
like to discuss a related area, in which we do have a
few decisions and some commentary, in order to
present some background which I think might be
helpful. That is the area of derivative suits in which
counsel enters an appearance for the corporation,
which is a nominal party defendant, and also enters
his appearance for the members of the management
who are named as individual defendants. The realities here are that the individual defendants are
being sued for liability which, if established, will be
paid over to the corporation; the corporation is the
ultimate beneficiary.
There have been a number of such cases. The
earlier cases seem to suggest that where there was
no immediately discernible conflict and, where the
corporation's activity in the lawsuit was practically
nil, that the concept would not put a serious block in
the way of this dual representation. The later cases
have indicated a sharply different point of view, in
my judgment. In a number of cases, motion has been
made by the plaintiff to strike the appearance of
counsel for the corporation on the ground that his
real loyalties run counter to the corporation and in
favor of the individual defendants. In a number of
cases, counsel for the corporation has been forced
to withdraw.13
There is also the very interesting question, which
has not been litigated in the corporate area in any

13. See Lewis v. Shaffer Storage Co., 218 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y.
1963). discussed in Note. Independent Representation for Corporate Defendants in Derivative Suits. 74 Yale L.). 524 (1965): Basch
v. Talley Indus., Inc., 118 BNA Sec. Reg. L. Rap. A-22 (Sept. 15,
1971); Seifert v. Dumatic Indus.. Inc.. 197 A.2d 454 (Pa. 1964);
Garlen v. Green Mansions, Inc.. 193 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1959): Essential
Enterprises Corp. v. Dorsey Corp., 182 A.2d 647 (Del. 1962);
Murphy v. Washington Am. League Base Ball Club, 324 F.2d 394
(D.C. Cir. 1903): Marco v. Dulles, 169 F.Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
See generally Annot.. Representation of Conflicting Interests as
Disqualifying Attorney from Acting in a Civil Case. 31 A.L.R.3d
715: Opinion 842 of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York: ABA Formal Opinion No. 594; Tockman, The Position of
Corporate Counsel in Derivative Actions. 51 111.B. 1.654 (1963);
Elden, Litigation under Illinois Securities Law. 60 Ill. B. 1.28. 42.45
(1971): Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 5. EC 5-16 and
5-18.
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significant way, of whether or not counsel who
enters an appearance for management in this kind
of litigation is acting in a manner antagonistic to the
corporation, which is his client, and whether
thereby he is not acting against the interests of his
client in a way to disqualify him from acting as
corporate counsel in some future situations.
In that connection, let me read a series of comments in a recent case involving a union representation. The case is Yablonski v. United Mine Workers
of America,'4 decided on July 21, 1971 by the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
per curiam. It is interesting to note that Judge
McGowan, whose remarks I read to you a few moments ago, was on the three-judge panel which
heard that case.
In Yablonski, the regular counsel for the union
had entered an appearance for both the union and
for individual defendants, who were the officers of
the union. The suit involved a dissident member of
the union asking to recover from the officers on
behalf of the union for alleged diversions of money.
Counsel for the union then withdrew as counsel for
the individual defendants, so that he would be no
longer acting in a dual capacity. Motion was then
made that he should not be permitted to act as
counsel for the union because he had previously
shown that his primary identification was with the
interests of the individual defendants. The court
stated:
"[In the exploration and the determination of
the truth or falsity of the charges brought by these
individual appellants against the incumbent
officers of the union and the union itself as a defendant, the UMWA needs the most objective
counsel obtainable. Even if we assume the accuracy of the appellee's position at the present time
that there is no visible conflict of interest, yet we
cannot be sure that such will not arise in the
future.
"Whether facts are discovered and legal positions taken which would create such a conflict of
14. Yablonski v. United Mine Workers of America, 448 F.2d 1175
(D.C. Cir, 1971).
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interest between the UMWA position and the
position of the individual defendant Boyle may
well be determined by the approach which
counsel for the UMWA takes in this case."15
The court here is making a very sophisticated and
realistic judgment that, in litigation or in the drafting
of documents or the shaping of a deal, the manner In
which the matter is tailored in the early stages may
determine the way it comes out and the way It fits in
the end. The court is perceptively indicating that
the bias of counsel who is engaged in dual representation may shape the matter in a way that counsel might not even be aware of, to the detriment of
the union and Yablonski, and also to the corporation
in a comparable case.
The court goes on to draw the obvious analogy to
the stockholders' derivative suit and says:
"Certainly no corporate counsel purports to
represent the individual officers involved, neither
in the particular derivative suit nor in other litigation by virtue of which counsel necessarily
must create ties of loyalty and confidentiality to
the individual officers, which might preclude
counsel from the most effective representation of
the corporation itself. The corporation has certain
definite institutional interests to be protected,
and the counsel charged with this responsibility
should have ties on a personal basis with neither
the dissident stockholders nor the incumbent
office holders.""o
IV. DUAL REPRESENTATION IN MERGERS

Turning to the Amax case, 7 the situation was
fundamentally this: The subsidiary (RST) was a
Zambian corporation; the parent, American Metal
Climax, owned some 42% of its stock. The subsidiary's problems in complying with Zambian law and
Zambian nationialization decrees presented the sub-

15. Id. at 1179.
16. Id. at 1181.
17. Kohn v. American Metal Climax. Inc., note 12, supra.
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sidiary with some very difficult decisions. Eventually, after considering some alternatives, the subsidiary and the parent corporation decided to merge
the subsidiary into the parent.
The negotiating team for the subsidiary consisted
of directors who were dominated by the parent and
who had close affiliations with the parent. The court
stated that counsel for the parent and counsel for
the subsidiary were the same. In the subsidiary's
solicitation of proxies (which was undertaken without the necessity of complying with the federal proxy
rules because the corporation was incorporated
outside the United States), an explanatory statement
was sent out to induce the outside stockholders of
the subsidiary to approve the merger.
The lawsuit, brought under 10b-5, asserted material deficiencies in this proxy solicitation material.
There were several alleged deficiencies which are
complex and interesting; I haven't time to consider
all of them in the context of our particular interests.
One of them was the fact that there was no disclosure that the same counsel advised both the
parent and the subsidiary. The court found that
failure to make that disclosure was omission of a
material fact and constituted a violation of Rule
lb-5.
The court stated that, "Sullivan &Cromwell thus
placed itself in a clear position of conflict of interest.
Though this position is sought to be justified because the RST directors agreed to allow Sullivan &
Cromwell to continue to represent it notwithstanding
the conflict. such agreement is meaningless in view
of AMAX'S control of RST and the RST board.
Nevertheless, even assuming that Sullivan & Cromwell could continue to represent both, their position
is a material fact which should have been disclosed
to the shareholders. It would be important for shareholders, in evaluating the advice of RST directors to
vote in favor of the amalgamation, to know that
through December 1969 RST was being advised by
lawyers who were also advising AMAX.**8

18. Id. at 1362.
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This case is now pending on appeal. It has been
argued, but no decision has yet been rendered. In
the brief of Sullivan &Cromwell, on behalf of appellants, it is stated as follows: "When it appeared,
however, in December of 1969, that Amax and RST
were to negotiate externalization of Amex's assets
on the basis that It would result in RST being treated
differently from other RST shareholders, Sullivan &
Cromwell promptly advised RST that it could no
longer represent RST and recommended that other
American counsel be obtained. At no time did
Sullivan & Cromwell advise RST with respect to
negotiations with Amex.""o In fairness to Sullivan &
Cromwell, I think that their withdrawal, which the
lower court did not mention, ought to be known.
A. Timing of Withdrawal
The question of whether or not their withdrawal
after the questions of the subsidiary's mode of procedure were well under way but before the form of
the transaction had crystallized, was a timely withdrawal is something about which we have very little
learning. I may say that the only thing that I have
found on that subject is Opinion 842 of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York which deals
with dual representation in a derivative suit and
says: "Wherever the facts are such as to make it
improper for the same attorney to represent both
classes of defendant throughout an action, it would
be equally improper for the same attorney to represent the two classes of defendant even for a short
period of time." I don't know how applicable that
comment is, but at least it does shed some modicum
of light on the question of the promptness of withdrawal.
B. The Possibility of Consent
If we alter the facts in the Amax case slightly, and
assume that counsel for the parent and the subsidiary represented both parties in the merger negotiations, a different issue is presented. Could there be
informed consent within the meaning of the Code of
19. Kohn v. American Metal Climax. Inc., note 12, supro, Brief
for Appellants.
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Professional Responsibility 20 which would be useful
and which would enable the same counsel to represent both sides? Although the court did not face that
precise question, It indicated that the board of directors of RST was dominated by Amax and, therefore, RST's consent was meaningless.
If there had been an independent majority on that
board-(and I think the likelihood of having an
independent majority on a board where you have a
dominant parent of this kind is very, very remotebut, if there had been), could they have given consent? I submit that they could not. In a case where
there is a clear, sharp conflict of interest, the Code
and the language of the court indicate that the lawyer himself must take the responsibility of refusing
to place himself in a position where his loyalties
must necessarily be divided and his judgment impaired. Obviously, the same view would hold if consent were given by independent minority directors.
1. Consent by Shareholders of Subsidiary
Assuming that such dual representation is not
permissible, is there anything else that counsel
could have done in the actual Amax situation? Could
counsel have got consent not from the board of directors of the subsidiary but from the minority
shareholders of the subsidiary; and would that have
been valid?
If my basic belief is correct that counsel could not
in such circumstances really convince himself without some kind of unsuitable mesmerism that he
would be able to act independently and properly on
behalf of both sides, I would suspect that the
approval by minority stockholders would simply not
give a suitable certificate of chastity to the dual
representation, assuming the consent could be

obtained. 20 a

20. See Code of Professional Responsibility. EC 5-16; see also
ABA Canon 6.
20a. For a different view, see remarks of Professor Folk, at
pp. 196-204, supra.
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2. Disclosure to Shareholders
If it were necessary to get such consent and if my
reactions on this are unduly strict or are in error,
then let us look at the situation from a practical
point of view; when could this kind of notice be
given? What would It have to contain and how
should It be presented? The language of the Code of
Professional Responsibility says that, before undertaking dual representation, counsel must be sure
that his judgment is not impaired or his loyalty
divided 2 ' and then, prior to acting, he must explain
the circumstances to the clients and must obtain
their consent. 22 The explanation which counsel
must make is one that gives the client the opportunity to evaluate the client's need for representation
free of any potential conflict and to explain fully to
each client the implications of the dual representation.
If counsel had to send out notice to shareholders
before accepting the dual representation and had to
explain to shareholders (a) that his judgment may
be affected, (b] what the sensitive points in the
situation are on which independent counsel might
be needed, and (c) the implications of not obtaining
independent counsel, I think that, as a practical
reality, such dual representation is not going to
eventuate. I would agree that it may well be possible
to obtain such consent in such a fashion in connection with the relationship between a mutual fund
and an adviser to the mutual fund, where you often
have a somewhat similar adversity of interest. That
consent could be obtained in connection with the
periodic approval of the contract between the fund
and the adviser and the annual approval of the
accountants.
3. Consent by Unaffiliated Directors
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: Stan, are you saying
that you have to go to shareholders for approval?
Why isn't approval by the unaffiliated or non-interested directors sufficient?
PROFESSOR KAPLAN: I don't think that the unaffiliated directors can speak for the corporation. I
21. EC 5-15.
22. EC 5-16.
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am not at all sure, even if such consent were given
in a situation where there is a directly adverse
interest, that the present Code authorizes counsel to
represent differing interests which leaves counsel
in a situation where either his loyalty might be impaired or his judgment affected.
The statement of Ethical Considerations in the
Code of Professional Responsibility (EC 5-15) puts on
the lawyer the obligation to "weigh carefully the
possibility that his judgment may be impaired or his
loyalty divided" if he undertakes dual representation, where the interests may possibly be different.
The lawyer is further required to resolve all doubts
against the propriety of the representation. 23 Consequently, I do not think that a lawyer who is asked
to represent both the parent and the subsidiary in a
merger transaction, a situation in which there are
significant possibilities of antagonistic interests,
can reasonably come to the conclusion that his
loyalty may not be divided or that his judgment may
not be impaired in such dual representation. Therefore I do not believe that a lawyer is justified in
undertaking such dual representation, According to
the Code of Professional Responsibility (EC 5-16), it
is only after the lawyer has made the determination
that he is justified in representing two or more
clients having differing interests that the question of
obtaining the consent of both clients-after proper
explanation-becomes relevant.24 Consequently, I
do not think that the matter of consent by an independent board of the subsidiary is meaningful because the question of such representation is ruled
out at an earlier stage because of the differing interests, which I do not think can be reconciled.
This, of course, raises the obvious question of
when, if ever, does the requirement of consent by
clients in a dual representation come into play.
Presumably, according to EC 5-15, it will come into
play only if the interests of the multiple clients "vary
only slightly," in which situation EC 5-15 says "it is
generally likely that the lawyer will not be subjected
to an adverse influence and that he can retain his
independent judgment on behalf of each client; and
23. EC 5-15.
24. See ABA Canon 6.
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if the interests become differing, withdrawal is less
likely to have any disruptive effect upon the causes
of his clients."
I do not believe the interests of the parent and the
subsidiary in such a situation as Amax 2 5 could be
said to involve a situation in which the interests of
the respective clients varied only slightly.
I realize that this statement of ethical considerations sets a very high standard and imposes the
burden of making a very serious decision squarely
upon the lawyer. I also believe that this statement of
professional responsibility probably bars the lawyer from representing multiple interests in many
situations in which many lawyers have heretofore
followed the practice of doing so.
Consequently in a situation such as Amax, the
present Code is probably susceptible of the interpretation that consent may well be ineffective, from
whomever it comes. Now, Imay be reading the Code
too strictly or harshly. But I would be very unsure if
I were to take the opposite position.
If I am wrong in that, and if consent is effective,
then it may be necessary to go to such portion of the
corporation as is independent for such consent.
And, I think that means independent in a practical
sense.
4. Consent by Minority Shareholdersof Subsidiary
If we look to the persons ultimately in interest,
namely, the minority shareholders of the subsidiary,
then it may very well be that their consent is all that
is necessary. If so, then counsel faces a serious time
element. There is also the basic question of whether
or not the affirmative approval of minority shareholders is necessary which, I suspect, will be difficult to obtain, because I suspect that inertia will
often prevent them from giving approval in this kind
of circumstance. I suspect that counsel may have
the problem of whether or not he can operate on a
consent to a proposal that counsel will act as a dual
representative unless there are a specified percentage of objections. Whether lack of objection is equivalent to consent is an arguable point; that question
25. Kohn v. American Metal Climax. Inc., note 12. supro.
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was argued in connection with reorganizations all
the way through the 1930's.
MR. FLEISCHER: I would think that, if you went to
the unaffiliated directors and they gave their consent, such action should be adequate in the sense
that the unaffiliated directors, in terms of responsibility under the Investment Company Act, make a
variety of decisions that affect the relationships
between the adviser and the fund which themselves
are conflict situations. 26
PROFESSOR KAPLAN: That may very well be
true insofar as the relationship between the adviser
and the fund is concerned, which is not, however,
conclusive in connection with the relationship of the
lawyer to his client. It may be that the Code of Professional Responsibility will be interpreted in accordance with your interpretation; or it may well
mean that the Code will have to be clarified either
by revision of its language or by an interpretation
by the Ethics Committee of the Bar Association. If it
remains in its present form, I think it leaves a very
serious problem for counsel to grapple with.
C.Penalties for Representing Differing Interests
Now, if counsel represents clients in a differinginterest posture without obtaining appropriate consent or without being freed from the necessity of
obtaining consent-in other words, If he directly
violates the Code, as the judge in the Amax case 7
said occurred in that case-what is counsel really
facing from the point of view of practical considerations?
I suppose that counsel, however distinguished,
who violates the Code of Professional Responsibility,
would face exactly the same kind of discipline as
would counsel who violates prohibitions against
ambulance chasing or any other prohibited activity;
censure, suspension, and, in aggravated cases, disbarment or more severe penalties.
26. The ability of independent directors of a fund to consent to
counsel's representation of both the fund and the investment adviser is discussed in Nutt. A Study of Mutual Fund Independent
Directors, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 179 (1971), and Mundheim & Nutt.
The Independent Directors of Mutual Funds, WHARTON QUARTERLY (Spring 1972).
27. Note 12, supro.
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Idon't really see severe discipline as a very likely
thing. But I do suggest that counsel who faces the
prospect of being embarrassed will act with greater
frequency and rapidity in introducing independent
counsel. I also recognize, realistically, that counsel
who replaces general counsel for both the parent
and the subsidiary will never be as free as one
might want where the subsidiary is negotiating with
its parent and where the parent nominates the subsidiary board. First, counsel will usually be selected
by the dominated board, although conceivably he
could be selected by the independent members of
the dominated board. Whether independent representation will result in any greater allocation of
securities or any fairer deal for the minority shareholders is something that I would hesitate to predict.
But I suggest that, if we believe in the adversary
system of representation and if we believe that
counsel should be as little subject to the restraint
which comes from the duality of interest as can be
arranged, then I would suspect that an opinion by
one of the ethics committees of one of the major bar
associations would have a very stringent effect
upon the practice of representing both the parent
and the partially owned subsidiary or both the
mutual fund and its adviser.
The need for independent representation of the
fund and its adviser at least in some situations of
critical conflict, would seem to be required by the
implications of Rosenfeld v. Block,2 8 which makes
clear the conflict between the interests of the fund
and of its advisers in connection with the transfer of
the management of the fund from one adviser to
another.
V. REPRESENTATION OF
SELLER OF A CONTROL BLOCK

A related problem occurs where counsel who represents the corporation is asked to represent the controlling shareholder who is selling his block of stock
at a premium. I interpret Perlmanv.Feldmann29 and
28. 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971).
29. 219 F.2d 173 (zd Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
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the later case of Essex v. Yates 30 as permitting a
controlling shareholder to sell his controlling stock
at a premium. I think the Perlman case imposes liability on the seller only because there has been a
diversion of either goodwill or something analogous
to a corporate expectancy or opportunity.31 Let's
assume that corporate counsel is consulted by the
controlling stockholder with respect to the sale of
his block of stock at a premium. Let's assume also
that the controlling stockholder was first approached with a merger offer directed to the corporation which would have given all shareholders the
same deal, but the controlling stockholder said, "I
will not vote for a merger but I will be amenable to
the sale of my block of stock at a price that I stipulate."
Could corporate counsel represent the controlling
shareholder in such a situation where litigation between the corporation and the controlling shareholder may be lying implicit in the transaction?
Similarly, can counsel for the corporation properly
consult with a director with respect to the possibility
of undertaking a transaction which may present the
possibility of being considered a corporate opportunity, if diverted from the corporation to the director?
I suggest that pretty much the same considerations
that weighed in the Amax opinion apply to this kind
of a situation. Who can give consent to such dual
representation, and whether effective consent can
be given in a situation of such sharp adversity of
interest, is uncertain. I suggest that even if consent
can be given, that counsel would be very well advised to avoid the question and to have independent
counsel dealing with both sides of such problems.
VI. TENDER OFFERS

Another aspect of professional conduct about
which I have been much troubled is to be found in
30. Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates. 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
31. A contrary reading of the Perlman v. Feldmann case can be
found in Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity
in the Sale of Shares,78 Harv. L. Rev. 505 (1965), and in Andrews
&Sergeant. Sale of Control:The Meaning of Perlimanv. Feldmann
Today in PLL. First Annual Institute on Securities Regulation
138-58 (1970). However, the problem discussed in the text
assumes that the Seller is improperly diverting a corporate opportunity.
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the area of tender offers. My own early practice in
the 1930's was largely in reorganization matters. At
that time there was much comment about "strike
suits," nuisance litigation, and "unprofessional
conduct." In a tender offer situation there are many
problems which I think ought to give the bar serious
concern. For example, one of the frequent current
gambits in the defense against the tender offer is
the filing of litigation, frequently on an antitrust
theory, by a target company against the party making the tender offer; those suits are often suspiciously suggestive of frivolous litigation for dilatory purposes.
A. Dilatory or Frivolous Litigation
In the recent suit by GAF Corp. against the Circle
Floor Co., 32 GAF's antitrust allegations against certain takeover aspirants were dismissed by the court
in the Southern District of New York with the observation that the complaint was "a form of gamesmanship from which the processes of a busy court should
not suffer."33 In view of the foregoing, was counsel
for GAF subject to criticism for bringing litigation
that might very well be considered frivolous? A
recent article on the subject of defense against a
tender offer says: "From the viewpoint of the corporation defending against the tender offer, the principal purpose of litigation is delay." 34
I wouldn't for a moment suggest that counsel does
not have the right to bring any litigation which is
proper and appropriate. But, I am not sure that the
bringing of any litigation whatsoever merely for the
purposes of delay is proper or appropriate. Are not
such tactics and advice at least arguably vulnerable
within the common law policy against fomenting
litigation? Do such tactics constitute forbidden
harassment through lawsuits, as proscribed by
Disciplinary Rule 2-109 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility?35
32. 112 BNA Sec. Reg. L. Rep. A-10 (July 28, 1971).
33. Id.
34. Herzel, Strategy and Tactics in Stockholder Litigation, 11
Corp. Prac. Commentator 364 (1970).
35. "The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations,
are mandatory in character. The Disciplinary Rules state the
minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without
being subject to disciplinary action." Preliminary Statement to the
Code of Professional Responsibility. See also DR 7-102(A) (1); ABA
Canon 30.
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I do not assert the affirmative to such questions
without doubt or trepidation; I do submit, however,
that a negative answer cannot with certainty be
given. I suggest, therefore, that lawyers and bar
associations must examine the role of counsel in
such matters and should focus sharply on the questions of propriety, instead of assuming that anything
goes in a fight. At the very least, the Marquis of
Queensberry rules still apply. It may be significant
that the only person quoted in the brochure setting
forth the Code of Professional Responsibility is
Abraham Lincoln, whose message primarily says
that a lawyer should: "Discourage litigation....
Never stir up litigation."
B. Acquisition To Enable Litigation
I suspect that one might raise a similar question
of improper conduct if counsel recommends to a
client, for example, as I have seen press accounts
suggest, that the client should buy a company so
that, when a certain expected tender offer Is made,
the recommended purchase will precipitate a
ground for the client's bringing of an antitrust litigation, thereby creating a synthetic situation designed to provide a basis for litigation. I'm not sure
at all whether such a recommendation might not fall
afoul of proscriptions against fomenting of litigation.
C. Perpetuation of Management
There is also another fundamental question in
connection with defending against tender offers.
We have all seen newspaper reports-if not
actual situations-describing drastic efforts to repel
outside purchasers of control and to perpetuate
current management through possibly selfdestructive methods, which have the potential of being
highly injurious to the corporation imbibing such
drastic medicine. For example, suppose management recommends a charter amendment requiring
that an 80% stockholders' vote shall be necessary
to authorize a merger, in a situation where management owns 21% of the corporation's stock. This
gives the 21% shareholder group total veto power
21

over the future of the corporation and disables the
corporation from agreeing, without the consent of
the veto-holders, to favorable future mergers which,
under customary voting arrangements, would be
readily available to the corporation.36 Or, take the
situation that was reported in the press with respect
to a Texas-based electronics company where the
corporation's loan agreement was changedallegedly at the instance of the borrower-to provide that the note automatically matured at the
option of the lender if there was a change in control
of the corporation. This places a corporation in the
position of risking financial hara-kir by making its
own position precarious in the effort to deter a
would-be acquirer. What responsibility does counsel
have in the handling of such a situation? Do standards of professional responsibility restrict counsel
from suggesting the possibility of this kind of tactics,
which may protect the management but may injure
the corporation? If so, who is counsel's real client
and who is he really representing? Does counsel
have an obligation to suggest or to insist upon notifying other shareholders of the possibilities inherent
in this type of charter amendment or loan provision?
Does he have the obligation to point out that this is
so questionable a practice that he will not be associated with either the planning of it or its implementation?
I suggest there is a serious problem of professional
responsibility in the handling of tender offers which
we should all consider. The promotion of frivolous
litigation should not be a permissible type of warfare. It does not accord with proper standards of
professional conduct to foment rearrangements of
corporate structures in a way that may Impose
serious restraints upon the corporation and inhibit
its development. The protection of incumbent management is not a sufficient ground to warrant the
use of such tactics.

36. See Wetzel, Defensive Tactics -Who Are the Goodies and
Who Are the Baddies?, 25 Bus. Law. 545 (1970).
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D. Defensive Tactics
In a number of recent articles on defensive
tactics 37 against tenders, various authors have
paraded a whole panoply of recommendations to
make target corporations less vulnerable: in too few
of these articles has question been raised with respect to the propriety of the conduct recommended
or the suggestion of even the remotest possibility of
any ethical considerations being involved. Since this
area of tender offers is one in which the tactics are
heavily influenced or affected by legal considerations and ramifications, the lawyer is often pretty
much in command; a wider recognition of the application of standards of ethical propriety in defensive
tactics and the development of some consensus on
the part of the organized bar concerning the permissibility of various tactics could help a great deal in
eliminating many questionable practices in connection with the defense against tender offers.
The Code of Professional Responsibility indicates
that counsel for the corporation owes his duties
directly to the corporation and not to the stockholders or to management or to any director.30
VII. COUNSEL'S DUTY TO THE CORPORATION
There is one interesting opinion, handed down in
1932 by the ABA Ethics Committee, which states
that a general counsel for a corporation who is also
a director and an officer of the corporation and
stockholder could not act as a proxy in a proxy contest and could not support a particular slate of
candidates.
37. On defensive tactics generally, see Bromberg, Tender
Offers: Safeguards and Restraints - An Interest Analysis, 21Case
W. Res. L. Rev. 613, 618-19 (1970); Cary. Corporate Devices Used
to Insulate Management from Attack, 25 Bus. Law. 839 (19701;
Fielscher & Mundhelm. Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer.
115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 317.360-70 (1987): Hays & Taussig. Tactics of
Cash Take-over Bids. 45 Harv. Bus. Rev. 135 (March-April. 1967):
lacque, Defenses against Uninvited Tender and Exchange Offers.
59 Ill. B.J. 106 [1970): Mullaney, Guarding against Take-oversDefensive Charter Provisions, 25 Bus. Law. 115 (1967): Note,
Defensive Tactics Employed by Incumbent Management in Contesting Tender Offers. 21 Stan. L. Rev. 1104 (1969).
38. EC 5-18.
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It says: "In his acting as general counsel, he is
acting as the corporation's attorney only and not as
the attorney of any group of its stockholders, directors, officers or individuals or any group or faction.
In acting as the corporation's legal adviser, he must
refrain from taking part in any controversies or
factional differences which may exist among stockholders as to its control." That language is almost
tracked by Ethical Consideration 5-18.
I realize it would be very difficult for any ethics
committee to police these very complex transactions
and these very uncertain obligations. However, the
NASD is doing almost the same task with respect to
brokers, judges are similarly equipped to do it, and I
think that possibly ethics committees might make a
beginning. I think that lawyers have the obligation
of focusing on such problems.
There has never really been much consideration
of these problems either in the courts, in the literature, or in the opinions. The case books on professional responsibility are singularly lacking in adequate consideration of lawyer's conflict of interest.39
I would like to leave you with the thought that there
may be some very serious problems inherent in this
series of situations for us as lawyers. We are acting
in an area of nebulous uncertainty with the possibilities of grave criticisms to which lawyers should
be responsive.
VIII. LIABILTY UNDER RULE 10b-5
I also would like to suggest one further thought.
Accountants and directors have unhappily found
that their standards are being policed by Rule
1ob-5.40 I am told that although counsel was not
named as a defendant in 10b-5 actions until recently,
that in some districts it is now becoming not un39. One recent article focuses specifically on the professional
responsibilities of counsel In acquisitions. See Mundheim. Representing the Acquired Company in Merger Negotiations: Some
Problems of Professional Responsibility, 10 Corp. Prac. COMMENTATOR 217 (1968).
40. See. e.g., Lanza v. Drexel &Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 92,826 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Halt v. Welitzen,
402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir 1968), cart denied, 393 U.S. 1074 (1969);
Fischer v. Iletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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heard of to name general counsel as an additional
defendant.
I would really be somewhat uncertain whether
counsel would be completely sure to be able to avoid
personal liability in a situation where there was a
serious deficiency in a document which subjected
the directors to 10b-5 liability, where counsel was
well aware of the whole set of facts and of the deficiency, and where counsel in addition had a conflict of interest which could be said to have influenced his position. I know of no case on this.41 I hope
I don't learn of any law on this.
I would, however, like you individually to consider
how you could defend that kind of litigation and
whether you feel that there might not be a possibility
of liability in such a situation which might give us
lawyers pause.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: The Commission has
also signalled its concern about the standards of
professional responsibility and the conduct of the
bar.
COMMISSIONER LOOMIS: That is true. We have
been worried a little bit about this. First, I want to
give you the background.
The practicing bar has an indispensable role in
the administration of the securities laws. Without
41. Recent developments in this area include. SEC v. National
Student Marketing Corp., Civ. No. 225-72 (D.D.C. 1972), where the
SEC is seeking injunctive and other relief against two nationally
prominent law firms who represented parties to a merger. The
complaint charges, inter alio, that defendants "failed to refuse to
issue their opinions [stating that all steps taken to consummate
the merger had been validly taken], failed to insist that the financial statements be revised and shareholders be resolicited, and
failing that, to cease representing their respective clients and,
under the circumstances, notify the plaintiff Commission concerning the misleading nature of the nine month financial statements." A lawyer is among the multiple defendants in the connected cases of SEC v. Caldwell Indus., Inc., Civil No. 71-5415
[S.D.N.Y. 1971). and SEC v. Fields, Civil No 71-5416 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
discussed in 132 BNA Sec. Reg. L. Rep. A-8 (Dec. 22, 1971). See
alsoBlack &Co. v. Nova-Tech. Inc.. 333 F.Supp. 468 [D. Ore. 1971),
where the court held a lawyer was a participant In an illegal
securities transaction because he prepared the legal papers
necessary to complete the sale, although he did not know and
could not have known of the illegal quality of the transaction. In
addition. the court held the law firm was a participant in the sale
because it authorized the company to include its name as corporate counsel on the 1968 and 1969 annual reports, which were
used in promoting the allegedly illegal sales. The court did, however. indicate that lack of knowledge about the illegal transaction
would be relevant at the subsequent proceeding concerning the
issue of liability.

25

their participation and skill, I don't think the Acts
would work. We are concerned and we are inclined
to feel that counsel who causes a particular course
of action to be pursued or who decides whether or
not investors will receive disclosure and, if so, how
and at what time, has some public responsibility to
the investors and stockholders whose interests are
also at stake. He needs to bear that in mind and not
to think of himself as having no responsibility whatsoever to anyone other than corporate management.
This does not mean that we are going to second
guess counsel who exercise a professional judgment
in good faith. But, if we conclude on the basis of the
facts of a particular case that there was not a good
faith exercise of professional judgment, then there
may be a problem.
This does not mean that we will be disturbed just
because counsel reaches a result opposite to what
we did. That is his privilege and prerogative. But,
I'm talking about the good faith exercise of professional judgment. If he is not acting in good faith, if
he is deliberately trying to help his client violate the
law, we are going to be disturbed about it and we
may well see what remedies are open to us.
A more difficult case on which we do not have
any view established yet is the case where counsel
was not deliberately acting in bad faith but where it
is obvious that what counsel did was indefensible
under the established interpretations of the
securities laws. Counsel at least knows that the
securities laws exist. We will be worried about that.
Whether we will do anything remains to be seen.
PROFESSOR MUNDHEIM: I would like to underscore Phil's remarks by reminding you of the recent
42
case of SEC v. Century Investment Transfer Corp.,
in which counsel was found to be an aider and
abettor of a securities law violation because of misleading opinion letters which he gave.
IX. QUESTIONS
PROFESSOR KAPLAN: I have had a couple of
questions in written form put to me which I would
42. SEC v. Century Inv. Transfer Corp.. CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
93,232 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1971).
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like to take this opportunity to answer. The first
question is:
"May not possible conflicts of interest in legal
representation of an Investment company and an
adviser be reduced if the independent directors
retain separate counsel from the counsel retained
by the investment adviser and the investment
company? If so, is it proper that the legal fees of
separate counsel for the independent directors be
paid by the investment adviser?"
The independent directors may well be benefitted
by the fact that they have separate counsel. However, if the board of directors as a whole acts on the
advice of counsel who represents both the adviser
and the investment company, it would seem to me as
if the problem is the same as that of the Amax case43
and that counsel's conflict of interest remains in full
force. If independent counsel for the independent
directors holds the same opinion as counsel who Is
in a conflict of interest position, such fact may bolster the opinion of the counsel with dual representation. If independent counsel for the independent
directors disagrees with the counsel who represents
dual interests, I would think that such fact would be
seriously embarrassing. I think that the better
course would be to have independent counsel represent the investment company rather than merely
representing its independent directors.
If separate counsel for the independent directors
is paid by the investment adviser, I think that such
fact might raise the question of the independence of
such counsel. Since counsel's fees are being paid by
a person who is in effect the opposing party in interest, this represents a potential kind of pressure to
which counsel should not be subjected and the
appearance of which should be avoided." I think
that it would be more appropriate to have counsel
for the independent directors paid by the investment
company; I have no doubt that that would be a legitmate expenditure of funds by the investment company. I am not sure, however, that, if the independent directors hired separate counsel and if the
43. Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., note 12, supra.
44. Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 9. EC 9-6.
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investment company refused to pay such counsel,
either the independent directors or counsel would
have the right to sue and obtain payment of counsel
fees for such separate counsel.
The second question that has been put to me is as
follows:
"A and B are about to merge. Counsel for A is
of the opinion that counsel for B is not adequate to
the task. Consequently, counsel for A takes the
primary role in drafting documents which under
normal circumstances would be taken care of by
counsel for B.
"Query (a): Is counsel for A representing both
A and BT"
Answer: If counsel is drafting documents which
deal with more than ministerial matters and if he is
undertaking the role of making decisions which have
significant effect upon B and if he purports to be
protecting B's interests, then I think he has undertaken the representation of B even though he may
not formally have been appointed by B to do so and
even though he is not being paid by B. Even if he is
undertaking this role solely by arrangement with
B's attorney and without B's knowledge, he has still,
Ithink, put himself in the position of representing B.
In this connection you might look at the language on
somewhat similar subject in E. F. Hutton Company
v. Brown.45
"Query (b): Must counsel for A withdraw unless
B gets new counsel?"
Answer: I am not certain that I understand the
full implication of this question but, if it raises merely
the point of whether counsel for A may represent A
without undertaking the role of also acting as a
guardian for B, I think that he may. I don't think that
A's counsel needs to withdraw merely because
opposing counsel is not competent. Whether A's
counsel should apprise A, his own client, or B, the
opposing party, of the situation presents other
questions. Idon't think it is permissible for A's counsel to advise B, the opposing party, of his counsel's
inadequacies. Whether A's counsel can advise A of

45. 305 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
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this fact or whether A can advise B raises questions
which I find difficult to answer with certainty.
"Query (c): Can counsel for A charge more due
to his extra efforts when he knows that B, the surviving corporation in the merger, will actually
pay the bill?"
Answer: Since I think it is a dangerous business
for counsel to undertake this dual representation,
either openly or surreptitiously, I have doubts about
his being compensated for work he should not have
undertaken. The fact that he charges A for work
done for B, knowing that B is going to absorb A,
doesn't seem to me to make the dual representation
any more permissible.
"Query (d): What, if any, would be the liability
to shareholders of B by counsel for A?"
Answer: This question assumes, I think, the
charge by B's shareholders that A's counsel misrepresented them or failed adequately to guard
their interests. Assuming that some action is taken
or omitted by counsel for A to the detriment of B,
can A's counsel be held personally liable for this
malpractice? Assume further that this action or
omission is one which would have given grounds for
a malpractice action by B against B's own counsel,
apart from the conflict of interest situation.
I think that counsel who is guilty of malpractice in
not properly representing his client would be at
least as likely to be held liable where he had a conflict of interest as where such a conflict of interest
did not exist, and perhaps more likely. I have not
done any research on the point, and I know of no
cases on this subject. I think that there would be a
very dangerous possibility of liability here and that
the conflict of interest posture might put the counsel
who is sued in the position almost of an errant fiduciary to the shareholders of B; he might very well be
exposed to liability. I think the position is dangerous
and that counsel should be very careful to avoid it.
Incidentally, it should be noted that it is not only
in merger situations where counsel for one side is
called upon to assist in representing his opponent. It
happens quite frequently in connection with the
drafting of registration statements, where counsel
for the underwriter is a highly sophisticated finan29

cial lawyer, and particularly in the representation
of companies going public for the first time, where
counsel for the issuer is not experienced in the
financial field. I think in all these situations the
temptation to take over the functions of counsel for
the other side can lead only to embarrassment,
rancor, and, possibly, liability.
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